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1 
STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF 
AMICI CURIAE 
The statement of identity and interest of amici are set forth in the 
Motion for Leave to File that accompanies this brief. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although this Court in State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 428 P.3d 343 
(2018), categorically eliminated mandatory life-without-parole sentences 
for juveniles, it did not address indeterminate sentences under RCW 
10.95.030.  Unless the child is under 16 when the offense is committed, the 
sentencing court remains free to set the minimum term of years at anywhere 
between 25 years to something short of life.  What this upper limit (de facto 
life) is remains undecided.  But regardless of the minimum term of years set 
by the sentencing court, because there is no guarantee of release once that 
minimum term is served, a child sentenced under RCW 10.95.030 may still 
die in prison.   
When a sentencing court sets the minimum term, it must determine 
whether the child is “the rare juvenile offender” who is “irreparabl[y] 
corrupt[ ].”  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. 
Ed. 2d 407 (2012).  Two problems immediately present themselves.  First, 
how is the court to determine whether a child—who had the physiological 
and biological characteristics of youth at the time of the offense—does not 
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have the capacity to change?  Social science suggests that it is extremely 
difficult to identify “the rarest of children[ ] . . . whose crimes reflect 
irreparable corruption.”  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726, 193 
L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), as revised (Jan. 27, 2016).  This situation presents an 
insurmountable risk of error.   
Second, the juvenile bears the entire risk of any error the court might 
make.  If the sentencing court believes that the child whom it is sentencing 
is capable of change, the sentencing court can set the minimum at 25 years.  
If the court gets it wrong and the child turns out to be one of the few who 
actually is incorrigible, the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) 
will have the facts before it and can prevent that person from being released.  
But if the court erroneously decides that the child is incorrigible and sets 
the minimum sentence at 48 years, the child has no reprieve.  Although he 
could have been rehabilitated, he will never get a chance to be a productive 
member of society.  A sentence of that length does not advance legitimate 
penological objectives.  In addition, society misses out on someone who 
would have become a contributing member if given a meaningful 
opportunity for release.   
This Court properly constrains sentencing courts’ discretion, based 
on the constitution, within the limits set by the legislature.  See Bassett, 192 
Wn.2d at 91.  As detailed below, sentencing courts are only giving the 
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minimum of 25 years when they have no discretion because the child was 
under 16 at the time of the offense; when courts have discretion, they are 
generally giving high-range minimum terms short of actual life—or what 
might be deemed de facto life—under the Miller-fix statute.  These 
sentences ignore that the discretion sentencing courts exercise is in fact 
constrained by Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 
L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), Miller, Montgomery, and by this Court’s extra 
protections given to juveniles under article I, section 14 of the Washington 
Constitution, see Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 73. 
 This Court should acknowledge that the high risk of error and the 
asymmetric consequences of error require a sentencing court to set the 
minimum term at the statutory minimum unless the State, by clear and 
convincing evidence, establishes that a particular juvenile belongs in the 
category of those rare youth who are incorrigible.  Anything else flies in the 
face of this Court’s jurisprudence that recognizes that children are different 
and that Washington’s Constitution gives greater protection to children, 





I. A sentencing court must set the minimum sentence at the bottom 
of the Miller-fix statutory range unless the State proves by clear 
and convincing evidence that the juvenile offender does not have 
the hallmark features of youth. 
 
Both the Supreme Court and this Court have held that juveniles 
constitutionally and categorically differ from adult offenders for sentencing 
purposes due to their lessened culpability and greater potential for reform.  
As a result, the Supreme Court requires that courts give juvenile offenders 
a meaningful opportunity for release.  A meaningful opportunity for release 
under the Washington Constitution means that courts must set the minimum 
sentence under the Miller-fix statute at 25 years because (1) identification 
of the rare incorrigible youth is extremely difficult and (2) the youth bears 
the risk of the court’s error.  Indeed, the ISRB fail-safe means that the rare 
irredeemable youth would spend the rest of his life in prison no matter his 
minimum sentence.  Thus, for these compelling reasons, courts must set the 
minimum sentence at the bottom of the Miller-fix statutory range unless the 
State can prove by clear and convincing evidence that a juvenile does not 
have the characteristics that define youth. 
A. Courts must provide juvenile offenders with a meaningful 
opportunity for release based on maturity and 
rehabilitation.     
 
This Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that 
“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
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sentencing” because of their diminished culpability and potential for 
reform.  Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 81 (“children are 
different” (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 481)).  Juveniles differ from adults 
in three major ways: their “‘lack of maturity and [ ] underdeveloped sense 
of responsibility’ lead[ ] to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-
taking,” they are more vulnerable to negative peer pressure and “brutal or 
dysfunctional” family situations, and their personality traits “are ‘less 
fixed.’” Id. at 477-78 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70, 
125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005)).  As a result, the actions of juvenile 
offenders are “less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’” Id. 
(alterations in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).  
Long prison sentences do not serve the goals of sentencing for 
children who have the “hallmark features” of youth.  Miller, 567 U.S. at 
477.  The “distinctive attributes” that separate children from adults 
“diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences 
on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.”  Id. at 472.  
Because “‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ relates to an offender's 
blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as 
with an adult.’”  Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 71).  Juvenile offenders 
are less deterred by harsh sentences because “they are less likely to take a 
possible punishment into consideration when making decisions.”  Graham, 
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560 U.S. at 72.  Incapacitation is also less compelling because courts must 
believe “that the juvenile is incorrigible” for the length of the sentence, 
whereas “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”  Id. at 72–73 (internal 
quotations omitted). Finally, imposing harsh sentences on juvenile 
offenders does not serve the goal of rehabilitation because “the juvenile 
justice system’s structure impedes rehabilitation, making that change more 
likely to be regressive.”  Aaron Sussman, The Paradox of Graham v. Florida 
and the Juvenile Justice System, 37 Vt. L. Rev. 381, 405 (2012); see also 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 79 (“In some prisons, moreover, the system itself 
becomes complicit in the lack of development.”).   
Sentencing courts must take those differences into account when 
sentencing all juvenile offenders.  Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; United States v. 
Briones, No. 16-10150, 2019 WL 2943490, at *4 (9th Cir. July 9, 2019) (en 
banc) (“even when terribly serious and depraved crimes are at issue”).  The 
requirement to treat juvenile offenders differently does not apply only to 
life or de facto life sentences.  In State v. Houston-Sconiers, this Court 
applied the Eighth Amendment requirement to “treat children differently” 
to juvenile offenders with 26- and 31-year sentences.  188 Wn.2d 1, 20, 391 
P.3d 409 (2017).  Indeed, the sentencing court must consider the “juvenile’s 
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” 
the effect of family and “peer pressures,” and “any factors suggesting that 
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the juvenile might be successfully rehabilitated” anytime that it sentences a 
juvenile offender.  State v. Gilbert, 193 Wn.2d 169, 176, 438 P.3d 133 
(2019).   
Harsh sentences should be “uncommon” because nearly all 
juveniles’ crimes “reflect[ ] unfortunate yet transient immaturity.”  Miller, 
567 U.S. at 479-80.  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, “rare” is the 
juvenile offender “whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”  Id. 
(quoting Roper and Graham).  In fact, a rule “forbid[s] psychiatrists from 
diagnosing any patient under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, a 
disorder also referred to as psychopathy or sociopathy, and which is 
characterized by callousness, cynicism, and contempt for the feelings, 
rights, and suffering of others.”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.   
As the United States Supreme Court said in Graham v. Florida, the 
Eighth Amendment requires courts to provide each juvenile offender with 
a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation,” regardless of their crime.  560 U.S. 48, 79.  The Court 
did not define such an opportunity.  Instead, Graham left it to the states, “in 
the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.”  
Id.  This State has already decided that the Washington Constitution 
provides greater protection to juvenile offenders than the Eighth 
Amendment, Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 82; see also id. at 81 (Miller applies to 
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de facto life without parole sentences).  And this Court held that youth alone 
can support a sentence below the statutory range.  See State v. O’Dell, 183 
Wn.2d 680, 696, 358 P.3d 359 (2015).   
This Court has yet to address indeterminate sentences under RCW 
10.95.030.   
B. Sentencing courts should set the minimum sentence under 
RCW 10.95.030 at 25 years to provide juvenile offenders a 
“meaningful opportunity for release” under the 
Washington Constitution. 
 
Because the “hallmark features” of youth reduce the penological 
justifications for imposing harsh sentences on juveniles and create a high 
risk of error, sentences beyond the bottom of the Miller-fix statutory range 
do not truly provide juveniles with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 477; Graham, 560 U.S. at 79. 
1. Sentencing courts cannot identify with certainty 
those rare juveniles who cannot be rehabilitated 
within 25 years.   
 
Miller’s central inquiry “reorients the sentencing analysis to a 
forward-looking assessment of the defendant’s capacity for change or 
propensity for incorrigibility.”  Briones, 2019 WL 2943490 at *6.  But a 
court cannot “with sufficient accuracy distinguish the [rare] incorrigible 
juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.”  
Graham, 560 U.S. at 77; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735.  As this Court 
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acknowledged, “even expert psychologists have” difficulty “in determining 
whether a [juvenile] is irreparably corrupt.”  Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 90; see 
also Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (referencing the rule against diagnosing those 
under 18 with antisocial personality disorder).  As a result, there is an 
“unacceptable risk that children undeserving” of a life-equivalent or near 
life-equivalent sentence “will receive one.”  Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 90.  The 
desire to incapacitate juvenile offenders “cannot override all other 
considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate 
sentences be a nullity.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.   
A recent Ninth Circuit case demonstrates that a juvenile offender 
can demonstrate the capacity for change within 25 years of his offense.  In 
Briones, the defendant was convicted and resentenced, post-Miller, to life 
without parole for first degree felony murder, arson, assault, and witness 
tampering.  2019 WL 2943490, at *2.  The Ninth Circuit held that the 
district court ran afoul of Miller because it failed to take into account the 
evidence of “Briones’s efforts to rehabilitate himself” between the 
“eighteen years that passed between the” two sentencing hearings.  Id. at *7.  
During that time, he “maintain[ed] a perfect disciplinary record, [ ] held a 
job in food service; volunteered to speak with young inmates about how to 
change their lives; completed his GED; and, in 1999,” married his high-
school sweetheart and the mother of his daughter.  Id. at *3.   
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Nevertheless, Washington courts have been resentencing juvenile 
offenders to life-equivalent or near life-equivalent terms so that the offender 
can be released, at earliest, around the age of retirement, 65.  Of the 22 
juvenile offenders resentenced under Washington’s Miller-fix statute, only 
seven will have an opportunity for release after serving 25 years in prison.  
Importantly, each of the seven who received the bottom range minimum 
sentence of 25 years were all under the age of 16 when they committed their 
crimes; because they were each under 16, RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(i) 
mandated that the minimum term be set at 25 years.  Stated differently, the 
minimum, 25 years, has only been given when sentencing courts had no 
discretion to set it any higher.  When sentencing courts have had the 
discretion to set it higher, they generally have set it much higher. Of those 
who were between the ages of 16 and 18 when they committed their crimes, 
upon resentencing, they received minimum sentences of 42,1 50,2 48,3 38,4 
                                                          
1 State v. Backstrom, No. 97-1-01993-6 (Snohomish Cty. Sup. Ct. June 27, 2017).   
2 State v. Boot, No. 95-1-00310-0 (Spokane Cty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 30, 2017). 
3 State v. Delbosque, No. 93-1-00256-4 (Mason Cty. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 2016) (this case). 




48,5 46,6 40,7 189,8 26,9 125,10 32,11 and 35,12 with three receiving LWOP.13  
As a practical matter, their first opportunities for release will occur around 
their retirement age.  A chance for release at retirement age is not a 
“meaningful opportunity.”  The reason that we grant offenders release is so 
that they will contribute to society, professionally and personally.  It will be 
difficult for an individual to reintegrate into society when he is eligible to 
take his first job at the age that most Americans retire.   
Given the extreme difficulty in distinguishing juvenile offenders 
who are incorrigible at the time of sentencing from those whose crimes 
reflect transient immaturity, there is a high risk of error in applying 
disproportionately harsh sentences to juvenile offenders.  
  
                                                          
5 State v. Furman, No. 89-1-00304-8 (Kitsap Cty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 26, 2018). 
6 State v. Haag, No. 94-1-00411-2 (Cowlitz Cty. Sup. Ct. Jan. 19, 2018). 
7 State v. Leo, No. 98-1-03161-3 (Pierce Cty. Sup. Ct. Nov. 16, 2016). 
8 The resentencing court in 2017 set a term of 189 years, even though this person was 14 
when he committed the crimes.  State v. Loukaitis, No. 96-1-00548-0 (Grant Cty. Sup. Ct. 
Apr. 19, 2017).   
9 State v. Hofstetter, No. 91-1-02993-0 (Pierce Cty. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2013). 
10 The initial resentencing court set a minimum term of 25 years for each of the 5 counts to 
run consecutively, resulting in a minimum term of 125 years.  State v. Phet, No. 98-1-
03162-1 (Pierce Cty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2016).  Mr. Phet’s Personal Restraint Petition was 
stayed pending Bassett and Gilbert.  That stay was lifted on May 21, 2019, but re-
resentencing has yet to occur.   
11 State v. Skay, No. 95-1-01942-5 (Snohomish Cty. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2016). 
12 State v. Thang, No. 98-1-00278-7 (Spokane Cty. Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 2015). 
13 State v. Ngoeung, No. 94-1-03719-8 (Pierce Cty. Sup. Ct. Jan. 23, 2015 & July 12, 2019); 
State v. Stevenson, No. 87-1-00011-5 (Skamania Cty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2017); State v. 
Bassett, No. 95-1-00415-9 (Grays Harbor Cty. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 2015).  One of these was 
Brian Bassett, and following this Court’s decision last year, his and the other two minimum 
LWOP sentences became invalid.  The point remains, however, that the resentencing 
courts, exercising their discretion, set the minimum sentence at the maximum.   
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2. The juvenile offender bears the entire risk of the 
sentencing court’s error. 
  
 Under Washington’s indeterminate sentencing scheme, a life-
without-parole sentence is always a possibility for a juvenile offender.  Even 
if the sentencing court sets the minimum sentence earlier than life, the 
minimum sentence represents only the earliest point at which the offender 
might be released.  RCW 10.95.030(3)(f).  There is no guarantee of release.  
In fact, the ISRB will not release the individual at his minimum term if it 
determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “it is more likely than 
not that the person will commit new criminal law violations if released.”  Id.  
The ISRB can incarcerate the individual for another five years before it must 
review his case again.  Id.   
 The defendant bears the entire risk of any error the court makes in 
setting the minimum sentence.  If the court overestimates the juvenile 
offender’s capacity for rehabilitation and sets the minimum sentence too 
low, the ISRB will have the appropriate evidence before it and can simply 
deny his release every five years until the end of his life.  If the court 
underestimates a juvenile’s capacity for rehabilitation, however, there is no 
chance that the ISRB can correct that decision.  Cf. Briones, 2019 WL 
2943490, at *3.  For example, if the court sets the minimum sentence at 48 
years, a 17-year-old juvenile offender will be in prison until he is at least 
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65, of retirement age.  As discussed above, the reason that this Court and 
the Supreme Court held that juveniles should be sentenced differently is 
because they can be rehabilitated and become productive, contributing 
members of society.  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  That purpose is 
undermined if an offender has no option for release until most of his peers 
are ending their professional lives.   
C. The State must have the burden to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the child is incorrigible to justify a 
minimum sentence over 25 years.   
 
 The defense need only prove an individual’s biological age to show 
that he possesses the “hallmark features” of youth.  See Miller, 567 U.S. 
at 471.  The differences between adults and juveniles that make juveniles 
“special” for the purpose of sentencing are biological and physiological.  
See, e.g., Briones, 2019 WL 2943490, at *4 n.3 (citing Graham and Miller).  
As this Court observed in O’Dell, “parts of the brain involved in behavior 
control continue to develop well into a person’s 20s.”  183 Wn.2d at 691–
92.  The State then has the burden to show that the juvenile does not have 
these biological and physiological characteristics or that, despite these 
physiological characteristics, the juvenile is incapable of being rehabilitated 
within 25 years.   
 The State must prove that the juvenile does not have the hallmarks 
of youth by clear and convincing evidence.  The general rule is that the State 
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can prove facts supporting a sentence within a statutory range by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149 
(1997) (per curiam).  But in special or extreme circumstances, due process 
requires that facts that “increase [a defendant’s] sentence [within a range] 
must be based on clear and convincing evidence.”  See Watts, 519 U.S. at 
156 & n.2; see generally United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 930 (9th 
Cir. 2001).  Here, special circumstances justify the higher burden: namely, 
(1) the high risk of error given how difficult it is to predict whether a child 
is capable of being rehabilitated and (2) the asymmetric consequences of 
the error: the offender bears all of the risk of an incorrect decision.  Unlike 
the determinate federal scheme in Watts and Jordan, the Washington statute 
has a fail-safe: the rare juvenile who cannot be rehabilitated will not be 
released, presenting no risk to society.  In the federal scheme, the offender 
will be released based on the sentence that the court ultimately selects.  
There is no fail-safe.   
 This holding is entirely consistent with Washington’s statutes and 
case law.   
 The State argues that every youthful offender is not entitled to an 
exceptional sentence because of O’Dell.  State’s Supp. Br. at 2-3.  But even 
if O’Dell stood for that proposition, that proposition has no effect here.  A 
minimum sentence within the statutory range—25 years—is not an 
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“exceptional sentence.”  And, as discussed above, O’Dell actually supports 
the Amici’s argument.  If youth alone can justify an exceptional sentence 
below the statutory range, O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 695-96 (overruling this 
Court’s previous conclusion that “youth alone could not be a nonstatutory 
mitigating factor under the SRA”); cf. id. at 693 n.10, then youth certainly 
can justify a minimum sentence at the bottom of the statutory range.   
 The Amici’s position is also consistent with State v. Ramos, 187 
Wn.2d 420, 429, 387 P.3d 650, as amended (Feb. 22, 2017).  First, to the 
extent that Ramos held that a juvenile offender has the burden of proof to 
justify a sentence, that holding applies only to juveniles who seek sentences 
below the statutory range.  Here, a 25-year sentence is within the statutory 
range.  See RCW 10.95.030(3).  Moreover, Ramos did not consider the 
Washington Constitution, which provides greater protection in this context 
than the United States Constitution.  Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420; see Bassett, 
192 Wn.2d 67.   
 Nor should State v. Gregg, No. 77913-3-I, 2019 WL 2912599 
(Wash. Ct. App. July 8, 2019), affect the Court’s decision here.  The Gregg 
defendant argued that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a juvenile’s youth was not a mitigating factor in order to justify a sentence 
within the statutory range.  Id. at *4-5.  The Court of Appeals disagreed.  
Like Ramos and O’Dell, Gregg is distinguishable.  Gregg argued for a 
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sentence below, not within, the statutory range.  In addition, the court relied 
heavily on the “Sentencing Reform Act of 1981,” which explicitly “places 
the burden of proving mitigating factors on the defendant.”  Id. at 1; see 
RCW  9.94A.535(1).  But the SRA does not apply to Mr. Delbosque’s 
situation.  The aggravated-murder statute, passed in 2014, is not part of the 
Sentencing Reform Act.  Compare RCW 9.94A, with RCW 10.95.030(3); 
see also Second Substitute Senate Bill 5064, 63d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2014).  Thus, the SRA does not prevent the Amici’s proposed holding here.  
II. The Court of Appeals properly determined that the State did 
not prove that Mr. Delbosque deserved a minimum sentence of 
48 years by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
 The Court of Appeals properly remanded Mr. Delbosque’s sentence 
for failing to comply with the Miller-fix statute in setting the minimum term 
at 48 years.  The “Miller holding” and a doctor’s testimony about Mr. 
Delbosque’s brain was sufficient to establish that Mr. Delbosque had the 
hallmarks of youth.  As the doctor testified to the sentencing court: “the 
major area in which youthfulness affects behavior is executive functioning 
because of the youth’s underdeveloped frontal lobe.”  State v. Delbosque, 6 
Wn. App. 2d 407, 411, 430 P.3d 1153 (2018), as corrected (Dec. 11, 2018).   
 The State did not present clear and convincing evidence to show that 
Mr. Delbosque did not have those biological characteristics or that, despite 
those biological characteristics, Mr. Delbosque is incapable of being 
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rehabilitated within a 25-year sentence after his offense.  The State relied 
only on the crime itself and an infraction that occurred 15 years into his 
sentence to conclude that Mr. Delbosque was effectively “irreparabl[y] 
corrupt[ ].”  Id. at 418.  As discussed in the Briones case, Miller “reorients 
the sentencing analysis to a forward-looking assessment of the defendant’s 
capacity for change or propensity for incorrigibility.”  Briones, 2019 WL 
2943490 at *6.  And a minor infraction after 15 years of incarceration is 
insufficient to prove that Mr. Delbosque is one of those rare juveniles who 
could not be rehabilitated.   
 Thus, this Court should affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision and 
remand for resentencing with a 25-year minimum sentence.   
CONCLUSION 
 It is extremely difficult for sentencing courts to identify youth who 
deserve sentences longer than 25 years, and the youth bears the entire risk 
of the court’s error.  These are compelling reasons to hold that courts must 
set the minimum sentence at the bottom of RCW 10.95.030(3)’s range.  The 
“rare” incorrigible youth presents little to no risk to society because the 
ISRB can always deny their release every five years for the rest of their 
lives.  Thus, this Court should hold that a sentencing court must always set 
the minimum sentence at 25 years unless the State can prove by clear and 
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convincing evidence that a particular juvenile does not have the “hallmark 
features” of youth.    
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